Wittgenstein’s philosophy of seeing-as: multiple ways to philosophical perspicuity

This entry is part 15 of 33 in the series Vol 2-2017

Abstract: The article explores the broad issue of aspectuality in Wittgestein’s philosophy arguing that Kippbilder, aspect change, perception of aspect, aspect blindness and Bedeutungserlebnis are related to a meditation on specific forms of subjectivity. Analysing different grammatical configurations of ambiguous images in (visual, acustic, sensomotiric) perception, in language and in art he also shows how aspectual structures combine simultaneous perception of two elements (et-et model, for exemple physiognomy and its expression) and mutually exclusive aspect perception (aut-aut model as in the duck-rabbit Kippbild). Wittgenstein seems to believe that this double model somewhat challenges classical rationality and that aspectual experiences should have a more relevant place in our form of life.

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