Der Anspruch der Gefühle in der Phänomenologie: Heidegger und Sartre en face der Epoché.

This entry is part 6 of 31 in the series Vol 1-2016

Abstract: The paper proposes an unusual approach to Heidegger and Sartre, showing a resonance in the way both thinkers radically reinterpret one of the most important requirements for the phenomenological method: the Epoché (phenomenological reduction). The comparison I suggest between Heidegger’s and Sartre’s critique, or raising of the Epoché is particularly interesting, considering the historical and political opposition between the two philosophers. And thus despite, or maybe even because of the fact that the relation between thought and action is not alien but fundamental to the question about the primary meaning of the existence in the phenomenological inquiry – which is the question of the Epoché. The radicalization of the Epoché concerns narrowly the meaning of the subject’s existence in its historicity and facticity, which Husserl, in both Heidegger’s and Sartre’s views, seems to have not considered deeply enough in order to grasp the pure field of subjectivity. On this common path of disagreement with Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre develop different ways to come to term with it.  To both, Husserl´s theoretical premise of the reduction seems to be the last repetition of the metaphysical prejudice against the importance of affects for the philosophical thinking. Heidegger does not refuse a sort of specific attitude as premise of the phenomenological method, he argues, however, that it must implicate and not suspend the facticity of the subject. With his conception of an event character of the Stimmung, which Heidegger elaborates after the publication of Sein und Zeit until the Beiträge and Besinnung, he radically reinterprets Husserl´s phenomenological reduction, without removing its temporal existential implication. Sartre too sees in the affect one and maybe the only possible trasformation of the Epoché. This happens already in his first philosophical essay, La transcendance de l´ego. But, Heidegger rethinks the reduction through the semantic field of Stimmung (mood), tracing the polysemy of the verb stimmen as root of Stimmung and of Stimme (voice). Sartre, on the contrary, considers the régard (gaze) as a fulfilled reduction, which delimitates the horizont of the phenomenality.

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