L’orizzonte metacritico della filosofia trascendentale nella «Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft» e nel saggio «Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit»

This entry is part 4 of 33 in the series Vol 2-2017

Abstract: This article explores the meaning of «transcedental philosophy» in Kant and Herder. The focus is on the metacritic horizon of a «philosophy of philosophy», defined as a synthetic creative knowledge that researches the «conditions of possibility» (Bedingungen der Möglichkeit) and the principles of the subjective forms of human knowledge. In this perspective, two essays are analyzed: Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774) and Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1799). The Metacritique is directed against the theoretical philosophy of Kritk der reinen Vernunft. The first part of this paper, from section 1 (La filosofia trascendentale e l’orizzonte «metacritico») to section 6 (L’appercezione pura e lo schematismo trascendentale), examines the meaning of a «metacritic philosophy» in relation to the limits of «pure reason»; the followings terms are analyzed: «menschliche Natur», «Grenzen der Vernunft», «Bedingungen der Möglichkeit», «reine Apperzeption», «ursprüngliche Apperzeption», «transzendentale Apperzeption» and «transzendentale Schematismus». The second part of the article, from section 7 (Sulla soglia) to section 12 (La libertà creativa: la natura umana e la creatività) is devoted to Herder’s Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit and focuses on the following terms: «Logos», «Vernunft», «Bildung», «Lebenswelt», «Natur», «Anschauung», «Freiheit», «limen», «subjectivity» and «creativity».

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L’antisoggettivismo intersoggettivo di Karl Löwith. Dalla critica del “solipsismo idealistico” al recupero della dimensione relazionale

This entry is part 19 of 31 in the series Vol 1-2016

Abstract: The article proposes a descriptive reading about subjectivity in Karl Löwith, from his first work (Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen, 1928) to the last naturalisc essays. The starting point is the criticism of the metaphysical and idealistic subjectivism in order to reconstruct an authentic idea of the subject as “relationship”, i.e. an ontological union of “I – you – history – nature”. We also focus on the points of tangency between the thought of Nishida Kitarō and Löwith’s philosophy of relationship.

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Der Anspruch der Gefühle in der Phänomenologie: Heidegger und Sartre en face der Epoché.

This entry is part 6 of 31 in the series Vol 1-2016

Abstract: The paper proposes an unusual approach to Heidegger and Sartre, showing a resonance in the way both thinkers radically reinterpret one of the most important requirements for the phenomenological method: the Epoché (phenomenological reduction). The comparison I suggest between Heidegger’s and Sartre’s critique, or raising of the Epoché is particularly interesting, considering the historical and political opposition between the two philosophers. And thus despite, or maybe even because of the fact that the relation between thought and action is not alien but fundamental to the question about the primary meaning of the existence in the phenomenological inquiry – which is the question of the Epoché. The radicalization of the Epoché concerns narrowly the meaning of the subject’s existence in its historicity and facticity, which Husserl, in both Heidegger’s and Sartre’s views, seems to have not considered deeply enough in order to grasp the pure field of subjectivity. On this common path of disagreement with Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre develop different ways to come to term with it.  To both, Husserl´s theoretical premise of the reduction seems to be the last repetition of the metaphysical prejudice against the importance of affects for the philosophical thinking. Heidegger does not refuse a sort of specific attitude as premise of the phenomenological method, he argues, however, that it must implicate and not suspend the facticity of the subject. With his conception of an event character of the Stimmung, which Heidegger elaborates after the publication of Sein und Zeit until the Beiträge and Besinnung, he radically reinterprets Husserl´s phenomenological reduction, without removing its temporal existential implication. Sartre too sees in the affect one and maybe the only possible trasformation of the Epoché. This happens already in his first philosophical essay, La transcendance de l´ego. But, Heidegger rethinks the reduction through the semantic field of Stimmung (mood), tracing the polysemy of the verb stimmen as root of Stimmung and of Stimme (voice). Sartre, on the contrary, considers the régard (gaze) as a fulfilled reduction, which delimitates the horizont of the phenomenality.

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L’ombra e le situazioni-limite in Karl Jaspers e Carl Gustav Jung

This entry is part 2 of 31 in the series Vol 1-2016

Abstract: The concept of “limit-situation” (Grenzsituation) is developed by Karl Jaspers primarily in Psychologie der Weltanschauungen and in Existenzerhellung, which is the second volume of Philosophie (1932). In later works, the concept of “basic situation” (Grundsituation) also comes to the fore: this concept is not historically conditioned, rather it characterizes human existence as it has always been, namely, as a “rupture in being”, a searching for unity that is destined to fail time and again. “Basic situations” denote the limits that are common for all persons; the limits against which the supposed wholeness and unity of Dasein crashes. To these belong especially the following situations: having to die, having to suffer, having to fight, being at the mercy of chance, and facing the inevitability of guilt. These “basic situations” become “limit-situations” if they transform from simple generalities into distressing experiences for the individual. According to Carl Gustav Jung, it is possible to define a semantic connection between “limit-situations” and the “dark side” of our shadow. «Everyone carries a shadow, and the less it is embodied in the individual’s conscious life, the blacker and denser it is». The shadow is composed of the dark and unknown aspects of our personality: it describes the “hidden side” of the human psyche that we would rather not acknowledge. As Dostoevskij, Jung defines the shadow the “underground of our soul”.

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