Nietzsche’s Critique of the Metaphysical Conception of Freedom

This entry is part 26 of 38 in the series Vol 4-2019

Abstract: This article analyzes Nietzsche’s critique of the metaphysical concept of freedom throughout his works, from Human, All Too Human (1878) to On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) and Twilight of the Idols (1888). It argues that, in criticizing the metaphysical concept of freedom, Nietzsche aims to target the metaphysical concept of substance that lies at its core. Substance is Nietzsche’s real target: while declaring men free, metaphysics actually makes them unfree by conceiving of them as substantial beings. Men are regarded as an unchanging essence, a substance with fixed intentions, from which actions emerge independently from each other in a kind of creatio ex nihilo. In light of its substantial conception of men’s being, metaphysics deprives men of the freedom to develop their character, personality and ultimately of the freedom to become masters of their own destiny.

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Miguel de Unamuno: il primato ontologico della coscienza

This entry is part 18 of 31 in the series Vol 1-2016

Abstract: This article focuses in presenting Miguel de Unamuno’s concept of the consciousness, one of the main cornerstone of Unamuno’s philosophical thought. In the unpublished Filosofía lógica (written in 1886), his philosophical first effort, Unamuno proposed a definition of consciousness which can be understood as the core of what would later become the existential primacy of consciousness.

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