Abstract: In the Transcendental Dialectic Kant reflects on the faculty of reason and its illusory claim to be able to get to know the thing-in-itself. Through paralogisms, antinomies and ideals Kant shows that the unifying aspiration of reason fails in the search for objective knowledge, but nevertheless plays an indispensable role in human progress, thanks to its regulative value. Jaspers recovers Kantian reflection to fight idealism and scientism and reads Kant in the light of the kierkegaardian and nietzschean enhancement of existence. In Philosophy Jaspers outlines a path in which the limits encountered by man in the search for a foundation lead to a fragmentation of knowledge and the different modes of existence must be kept in constant dialogue through reason, in order to experience the «Umgreifende». Hersch starts from Jaspers to elaborate a kantian ontology in which man’s essence is to make and create his own reality, giving shape to matter through his own grip. Man can not arrive at objective knowledge, but reason nevertheless pushes the subject to constantly overcome himself in free creation, to build that authenticity promised to him by his own nature. At the end of the path a “rational a-logic” is elaborated in which metaphysics is directly linked to praxis and capable of maintaining a dialectical relationship with the irrational.
Abstract: The paper proposes an unusual approach to Heidegger and Sartre, showing a resonance in the way both thinkers radically reinterpret one of the most important requirements for the phenomenological method: the Epoché (phenomenological reduction). The comparison I suggest between Heidegger’s and Sartre’s critique, or raising of the Epoché is particularly interesting, considering the historical and political opposition between the two philosophers. And thus despite, or maybe even because of the fact that the relation between thought and action is not alien but fundamental to the question about the primary meaning of the existence in the phenomenological inquiry – which is the question of the Epoché. The radicalization of the Epoché concerns narrowly the meaning of the subject’s existence in its historicity and facticity, which Husserl, in both Heidegger’s and Sartre’s views, seems to have not considered deeply enough in order to grasp the pure field of subjectivity. On this common path of disagreement with Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre develop different ways to come to term with it. To both, Husserl´s theoretical premise of the reduction seems to be the last repetition of the metaphysical prejudice against the importance of affects for the philosophical thinking. Heidegger does not refuse a sort of specific attitude as premise of the phenomenological method, he argues, however, that it must implicate and not suspend the facticity of the subject. With his conception of an event character of the Stimmung, which Heidegger elaborates after the publication of Sein und Zeit until the Beiträge and Besinnung, he radically reinterprets Husserl´s phenomenological reduction, without removing its temporal existential implication. Sartre too sees in the affect one and maybe the only possible trasformation of the Epoché. This happens already in his first philosophical essay, La transcendance de l´ego. But, Heidegger rethinks the reduction through the semantic field of Stimmung (mood), tracing the polysemy of the verb stimmen as root of Stimmung and of Stimme (voice). Sartre, on the contrary, considers the régard (gaze) as a fulfilled reduction, which delimitates the horizont of the phenomenality.