Nietzsche’s Critique of the Metaphysical Conception of Freedom

This entry is part 26 of 38 in the series Vol 4-2019

Abstract: This article analyzes Nietzsche’s critique of the metaphysical concept of freedom throughout his works, from Human, All Too Human (1878) to On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) and Twilight of the Idols (1888). It argues that, in criticizing the metaphysical concept of freedom, Nietzsche aims to target the metaphysical concept of substance that lies at its core. Substance is Nietzsche’s real target: while declaring men free, metaphysics actually makes them unfree by conceiving of them as substantial beings. Men are regarded as an unchanging essence, a substance with fixed intentions, from which actions emerge independently from each other in a kind of creatio ex nihilo. In light of its substantial conception of men’s being, metaphysics deprives men of the freedom to develop their character, personality and ultimately of the freedom to become masters of their own destiny.

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Dialettica della durata e vita intima. Attualità di Bergson tra accelerazione del tempo e alienazione sociale

This entry is part 11 of 38 in the series Vol 4-2019

Abstract: In this paper the Author focuses on the legacy of dialectics through Bergson’s considerations about time and language, recalling two great interpreters of his philosophy: Giuseppe Prezzolini and Gaston Bachelard. If for the former the «philosophy of contingency» enhances the transformation of social reality, preserving, in consonance with Victor Egger’s book La parole intérieure, the freedom of inner language, the latter proposes a break of the Bergsonian temporal continuity by opting for a plural and discontinuous duration. Thanks to these readings, it is possible to discover the temporal dialectic which regulates contemporary societies, that is, the acceleration of time and the contraction of memory, in order to develop a more humane way of living time and, consequently, to decline the problem of intersubjectivity in an intercultural perspective.

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Wittgenstein’s philosophy of seeing-as: multiple ways to philosophical perspicuity

This entry is part 15 of 33 in the series Vol 2-2017

Abstract: The article explores the broad issue of aspectuality in Wittgestein’s philosophy arguing that Kippbilder, aspect change, perception of aspect, aspect blindness and Bedeutungserlebnis are related to a meditation on specific forms of subjectivity. Analysing different grammatical configurations of ambiguous images in (visual, acustic, sensomotiric) perception, in language and in art he also shows how aspectual structures combine simultaneous perception of two elements (et-et model, for exemple physiognomy and its expression) and mutually exclusive aspect perception (aut-aut model as in the duck-rabbit Kippbild). Wittgenstein seems to believe that this double model somewhat challenges classical rationality and that aspectual experiences should have a more relevant place in our form of life.

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Der Anspruch der Gefühle in der Phänomenologie: Heidegger und Sartre en face der Epoché.

This entry is part 6 of 31 in the series Vol 1-2016

Abstract: The paper proposes an unusual approach to Heidegger and Sartre, showing a resonance in the way both thinkers radically reinterpret one of the most important requirements for the phenomenological method: the Epoché (phenomenological reduction). The comparison I suggest between Heidegger’s and Sartre’s critique, or raising of the Epoché is particularly interesting, considering the historical and political opposition between the two philosophers. And thus despite, or maybe even because of the fact that the relation between thought and action is not alien but fundamental to the question about the primary meaning of the existence in the phenomenological inquiry – which is the question of the Epoché. The radicalization of the Epoché concerns narrowly the meaning of the subject’s existence in its historicity and facticity, which Husserl, in both Heidegger’s and Sartre’s views, seems to have not considered deeply enough in order to grasp the pure field of subjectivity. On this common path of disagreement with Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre develop different ways to come to term with it.  To both, Husserl´s theoretical premise of the reduction seems to be the last repetition of the metaphysical prejudice against the importance of affects for the philosophical thinking. Heidegger does not refuse a sort of specific attitude as premise of the phenomenological method, he argues, however, that it must implicate and not suspend the facticity of the subject. With his conception of an event character of the Stimmung, which Heidegger elaborates after the publication of Sein und Zeit until the Beiträge and Besinnung, he radically reinterprets Husserl´s phenomenological reduction, without removing its temporal existential implication. Sartre too sees in the affect one and maybe the only possible trasformation of the Epoché. This happens already in his first philosophical essay, La transcendance de l´ego. But, Heidegger rethinks the reduction through the semantic field of Stimmung (mood), tracing the polysemy of the verb stimmen as root of Stimmung and of Stimme (voice). Sartre, on the contrary, considers the régard (gaze) as a fulfilled reduction, which delimitates the horizont of the phenomenality.

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